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Although Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) have been undertaken worldwide to protect 
biodiversity while addressing social and 
economic needs of communities, they have 
also been subjected to wide critique for their 
lack of effectiveness in achieving conservation-
development win-win scenarios (Bauch et al., 
2014 Hughes and Flintan, 2001). For instance, 
Barrett and Arcese (1995) pointed out that 
conservation goals often take precedence, and 
because livelihood needs are not meaningfully 
addressed, illegal (and often unsustainable) 
harvesting persists. Berkes et al. (2003) argued 
that the restrictions established by current 
conservation methods have deprived the local 
communities of opportunities necessary for their 
survival and development. Indeed, ICDPs seem to 
have an implicit bias toward conservation, given 
that they typically occur in areas with perceived 
high levels of biodiversity that is worth preserving 
for its own sake and/or for tourism. Moreover, 
the revenue generated by conservation, such 
as tourism, often serves national development 
over local development. In other words, local 
development is rarely a true priority and outcome 
from ICDPs. Such negative perspectives dominate 
ICDP-related literature. 
Despite the widespread critiques of ICDPs, the 
Annapurna Conservation Area Project (ACAP) in 
the highlands of Nepal has been largely described 
as an example of an ICDP done right (Hughes and 
Flintan, 2001; Bajracharya et al., 2007; Spiteri and 
Nepal, 2008; Ojha et al., 2010). Launched in 1986, 
the ACAP aims to conserve natural resources for 
the benefit of present and future generations, bring 
sustainable social and economic development to 
the local people, and develop tourism in a way 
that has minimum negative impact on the natural, 
socio-cultural, and economic environments 
(NTNC, 2010). Participatory forestry in the 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) have been undertaken 
in many countries due to expectations of their supporting both natural resource 
sustainability and livelihoods. However, they have been challenged by critics over the 
years, who claim that conservation goals take precedence over local development 
in practice, thereby worsening the vulnerability of resource-dependent people. 
Nonetheless, one ICDP implemented in Nepal, the Annapurna Conservation Area 
Project (ACAP), has been largely regarded by researchers and practitioners as an 
ICDP success case. Under the authority of a conservation-oriented NGO, ACAP, 
the ICDP engages local communities participatory for resource management. One 
community within ACAP has been found to have a substantial timber surplus that 
satisfies conservation goals, but could also become a sizeable and sustainable source 
of income for local development. We interrogate the rules and practices of timber 
management in this community to explore the why behind this practice, discussing 
how modes of environmental governance aimed at producing behaviors to manage 
natural resources in particular ways (‘environmentalists’) feature in the seemingly 
conservation-oriented de jure rules and de facto practices and in authority relations in 
and around the community. 
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form of local Conservation Area Management 
Committees (CAMC) has been implemented 
across much of the ACAP, to enroll residents 
as custodians of the forests and other natural 
resources. According to legislation (GoN, 1996), 
the primary responsibility of the CAMCs (as per 
Sections 14 and 15) is to prepare and implement 
a Management Work Plan, which lays out among 
other details, the rules and restrictions for forest 
product harvesting. 
Recent research carried out in part of the ACAP 
indicates that a CAMC situated in the lower part 
of the Mustang district, the so-called ‘timber 
basket’ of the region, has established a low 
quota for timber extraction. Meilby et al., (2014) 
argue that, within the sustainable limits of the 
forest, the commercial use of timber could bring 
approximately three-folds additional income 
to this community. This would be of particular 
interest for the communities in this region, 
where forest income makes up in average 22% 
(12‒31%) of the overall income and is of crucial 
importance especially to the poorest households 
(Rayamahji et al., 2012). Although research 
in the regional context suggests a tendency for 
top-down technocratic approaches favoring 
conservation in this area (Meilby et al., 2014, 
Rutt et al., 2014, Ohja et al., 2014), there is a 
knowledge gap on “why” local decision-makers 
would leave commercial timber standing, when 
it has the potential to increase the incomes of the 
community through harvest and sale. 
Thus, a question persists : what is the rationale 
behind the decision to keep trees standing? 
To respond, we refer to existing scholarship 
describing the production of environmental 
subjects while examining the status of and 
rationales behind four main timber rules and 
practices : how much the communities can/do 
harvest; what they can harvest; where/who they 
can sell to; and how much they can sell for. These 
rules and practices are deemed most significant 
for conservation and development objectives. 
Further, we examined perceptions of local 
development needs and ambitions, including 
in relation to forest conservation. This study 
provides a case to the growing body of research 
looking to understand why decision-makers enact 
and adopt certain conservative standards under 
the trade-off conditions of conservation and local 
development. Furthermore, the rules, practices 
and their rationales presented here can be helpful 
to setting up future projects also pursuing the 
critical dual goals of resource conservation and 
human wellbeing. 
Explaining conservation behaviour : 
‘environmentalities’
A dominant perspective to explain why 
different actors practice resource conservation 
behaviour stems from the Foucauldian notion 
of governmentality (the cultivation of self-
regulation in line with the interests of a governing 
power), in relation to environmental governance 
and behaviours. Called ‘environmentality’, this 
perspective originally examined shifts in belief 
systems toward a supposed intrinsic valuation 
of natural resources. Environmentalities are 
poststructural conceptualizations of modes of 
environmental governance (Bluwstein, 2017) 
aimed at the production of behaviours that protect 
and manage the material environment in certain 
ways (Fletcher, 2010; Agrawal, 2005). Agrawal 
(2005) described how “environmental subjects” 
are created that care about resource conservation. 
He found firstly, that individuals’ beliefs about 
forests were found to vary not because of socio-
economic aspects, but because of people’s 
involvement in regulatory practices (Agrawal, 
2005). Through participation in forest protection, 
the values held by the local "environmental 
subjects" were reshaped to converge with those 
of the ruling power, which in this case largely 
favoured resource conservation. 
In more recent work on this concept, scholars have 
extended the notion to describe multiple types of 
environmentalities. Fletcher, (2010) draws from 
the extensive work of Foucault to elaborate four 
variations : disciplinary, neoliberal, sovereign, 
and truth environmentalities. Disciplinary 
environmentality is an authoritative technique 
of government through the invocation of an 
environmental morality (largely the version put 
forth by Agrawal). Neoliberal environmentality 
is implemented through economic incentives that 
assume and cultivate self-interest and competition, 
and steeringbehaviour towards productive ends. 
Sovereign environmentality invokes the power 
of the state authorities, typically manifesting 
through other environmentality projects and 
often visible in the conservation sector through 
command and control, ‘fences and fines’ type 
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approaches. Finally, truth environmentality is 
employed by people and institutions to promote 
supposed universal ideas (e. g. wilderness, nature, 
indigeneity) or depict an essentialist connection, 
such as between ‘indigenous’ or ‘local’ people 
and ‘nature’ (Bluwstein, 2017). These ‘truths’ 
can serve diverse agendas, from empowerment 
of typically vulnerable groups to conservation 
ambitions.
Fletcher, (2010) describes how these different 
forms of environmental subject-making 
occasionally overlap. He provides an example 
: “neoliberal governmentality could be seen 
as reliant upon certain disciplinary techniques 
to facilitate its operation. That is, disciplinary 
governmentality would be necessary to construct 
the rational actors upon which neoliberal 
governmentality would then operate”.  He also 
notes that different governmentalities may also 
conflict, constituting “the terrain of political 
debate” and “leading to debate concerning the 
proper approach to governance within a given 
situation”. While the entanglement of and conflict 
amongst environmentalities is of great interest, 
we focus mainly on utilizing these concepts as 
co-existent explanatory tools to better understand 
the rationales at work in relation to the timber 
rules and practices in this context. This unfolds in 
the later discussion section. 
Materials and methods
Study site
Our study site is located in the Mustang District of 
highland Nepal. It encompasses multiple villages 
totaling almost 80 km2, with around 1000 inhabitants 
across approximately 150 households, that largely 
engage in agriculture as the main income source 
(CBS, 2011, Larsen et al., 2014). Locals depend 
on firewood for subsistence needs and timber as a 
source of income (Larsen et al., 2014). Tourism is 
an increasingly viable livelihood activity for people 
in the region (Urothody and Larsen, 2010). 
The ACAP is managed by the Nepali NGO 
National Trust for Nature Conservation 
(NTNC), which was granted temporary 
management authority under the supervision of 
the Department of National Parks and Wildlife 
Conservation, within the Ministry of Forest and 
Soil Conservation. The NTNC officials (‘ACAP 
officers’), i.e. a Chief Conservation Officer and 
technical support staff, work with and provide 
support and oversight for local Conservation Area 
Management Committees (CAMC). The CAMC 
members consist of the Chairperson of the local 
government body (called Village Development 
Committee (VDC), one internally nominated 
representative from each VDC sub‒divisions 
(called wards), and five persons nominated by the 
ACAP Chief Conservation Officer from among 
the local users - for a total of 11 members in the 
CAMC in our site. Members of the CAMC self-
select their leadership (Chairperson, Secretary, 
etc.). Forest Management Sub‒committees 
(FMSC) are formed to address ward-based 
management tasks such as the evaluation of 
timber requested by households (Larsen et al. 
2014). ACAP officers also frequently take part in 
the CAMC meetings. 
Data collection
The field research occurred over two weeks in early 
2016. Data was obtained through several methods : 
(i) literature review, (ii) semi-structured individual 
and group interviews, with nine CAMC and sub‒
committee members (many of whom also sit on the 
main CAMC), with three ACAP officers (in one 
group interview), and informally with three Nepali 
forestry scholars with substantial knowledge of 
this CAMC – making a total of 11 interviews, and 
(iii) data extraction from the CAMC operational 
plan (2009), timber transaction records, and 
meetings minutes. Unofficial discussions with 
approximately ten residents that do not hold 
CAMC positions and observation of conditions in 
the villages and forest were used for triangulation. 
Interviews were carried out simultaneously in 
English and Nepali with the aid of a translator 
acquainted to the local context. All interviews 
were recorded and transcripted. Documents in 
Nepali were translated. Interview transcripts and 
supporting documents were analysed by following 
an interpretative approach (Elliott and Timulak, 
2005). Quantitative data on timber harvest records, 
income, price, and sale were analysed using Excel. 
Results and discussion
Results
The following section presents four main timber rules 
(de jure) and practices (de facto), namely how much, 
what, where, and for how much, as well as perceptions 
on local development needs and ambitions. 
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How much can/do they harvest ?
The CAMC management operational plan provides 
an upper limit for timber extraction of 5000 ft3 
(141.58 m3) for use by insiders and 3500 ft3 (99. 
11 m3) for use by outsiders, making a total of 
approximately 8500 ft3 (240.69 m3) per annum 
(Rutt et al., 2014). Timber transaction records show 
the total harvest between 2008/9 to 2015/16 (in 
accordance with the Nepali calendar; Fig. 1). The 
amount consists of extraction for both ‘insiders’, 
or those from within the CAMC territory, as well 
as ‘outsiders’, who live within the same Mustang 
district and within the overall ACAP. As is shown 
in Figure 1, the total harvest has exceeded the limit 
stated in the plan. In fact, the CAMC members 
described the practice of an “extraction system” of 
a 60/40 ratio using dead or dying wood, whereby 
60% of any dead and dying wood can be harvested, 
with 40% left in the forest to support biodiversity 
conservation and soil fertility as well as to retain 
some usable wood for the (near) future, as needed. 
Interviews revealed what appears to be a heavy 
reliance on the ACAP technicians to give approval 
regarding how much of the available timber 
actually constitutes the harvestable 60 (or 80) 
percent. For example, one sub-committee member 
explained : "In the event of a storm, for instance, 
we just call the ACAP officials and they do the 
monitoring with special method and we harvest 
according to the forest technicians’ estimates”. In 
times of crisis, such as heavy storms, forest fires, 
and earthquakes - events which both make timber 
available for extraction but also increase demand for 
repair of buildings, fences, and other infrastructure 
- the system changes to 80/20. As mentioned 
by interviewees, peak times visible in the graph 
coincide with incidences of such emergencies, 
most recently the 2015 earthquake. 
Fig. 1: Trend of Timber extraction (from sales 
records) of the CAMC, 2008/9 ‒ 2015/16
The years on the graph reflect the Nepali calendar. 
For instance, the year 2008/09 on the graph reflects 
the Nepali year of 2065, which begins in April/
May 2008 and ends on March/April 2009 when 
translated into the English calendar. This explains 
why the years on the graph overlap. Insiders are 
consumers of timber within the CAMC. Outsiders 
are consumers of timber outside the CAMC, but 
within the Mustang district of which the CAMC 
is a part. The “Upper Limit” is the total amount of 
timber that can be extracted for use as stipulated 
in the sites forest management plan. 
Yet, forest inventory data from Meilby et al. 
(2014) based on estimates of annual tree volume 
increments and extractions from 122 permanent 
plots in the High mountain site (of which the 
CAMC territory is a part), over a period of five 
years (2005 ‒ 2010), suggest that the actual annual 
harvest of timber in the CAMC area is lower than 
what the sustainable harvest levels should be for 
their forest. Specifically, they state that about 
4192 m3 yr-1 (i.e. 80% of the estimated 5240 
m3yr-1 mean annual increment) is the sustainable 
harvest level for the High mountain forest. 
What can they harvest ?
To meet local timber needs, the operational 
management plan (2009) states permitted 
species for harvest and sale include Pine (Pinus 
wallichiana), Dhupi (Cupressus torulosa) and 
Kisin (Tsuga dumosa) and “the dried and felled 
tree should be provided by the committee”. The 
plan prioritizes “dried and felled tree”, which is 
notable given the higher economic and use value 
of green (live) timber. The plan continues, “In 
case of green or standing tree, the girth should 
exceed 5 ft”. However, trees with a girth over 
5 ft are uncommon in this forest. Further, as 
elaborated by inter viewers, for the previous 
three years, the felling of green trees had been 
effectively banned. Exceptions occurred only 
under very special conditions - such as when dead 
or dying wood is in short supply and an urgent 
(non-commercial) need emerges - and only in 
“very limited” quantity. 
The reasons given to support the ban included 
a preoccupation with the capability of the 
forest to provide for future generations. One 
committee member explained : “green tree 
felling [happened] only in the beginning [when 
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the CAMC was formed] but when we became 
more aware of conservation we stopped doing 
that”. Some raised the point that the forest litter 
provided by green trees is an essential input (e.g., 
manure) to local agriculture, especially since they 
do not use commercial fertilizer. Others explained 
that allowing for green timber harvest will likely 
incentivise people to harvest green timber close 
to the villages and to the most accessible places 
and trails, instead of going far inside into the 
forest to harvest available dead and dying wood. 
If this happens, it may reduce the aesthetic or 
touristic value along for instance trails, and this 
they believe can negatively affect the emerging 
ecotourism in the area. 
Another driver behind the ban appeared to be 
pressure from the ACAP. A general consensus 
seems to have been established between the 
CAMC and ACAP officials to refrain from using 
green trees for the foreseeable future. When 
pushed in interview, a few CAMC officials 
admitted that “from time to time we have raised 
our concern and interest in using green trees for 
harvesting but the ACAP does not approve, they 
tell us it’s not good”. In a separate interview, The 
ACAP officials acknowledged, “There are a few 
that are not happy. ” Yet they justified their position 
by explaining, “The district has areas with very 
little trees, so all have to conserve. Yes, we bind 
[this area] to rules, like other areas. We have our 
directives, we must follow, for conservation. The 
forest is also home to other biodiversity. We can 
not forget this.” 
At the same time, a visit to one of the arguably 
most elite members of the community (owning 
comparatively large assets) and of the CAMC 
(having held several executive positions), 
admitted during a field visit that green trees 
are “occasionally” used to construct fencing on 
his private property (with non-timber species 
used for fencing, and timber species for poles). 
He acknowledged this was officially against 
the rules, but justified it by its limited extent. 
During another field visit with a small group of 
the CAMC members from ward level (who by 
appearances were significantly less wealthy), 
fervently expressed the view that a green tree ban 
was absolutely essential for the wellbeing of the 
resource. When pushed to consider circumstances 
under which it could be appropriate, e. g. if 
they learned that they had sufficiently abundant 
resources, they nearly refused to hear the 
arguments, taking a firm stand that harvesting 
green trees is not a possible option for them. This 
dissonance we observed in beliefs and practice 
across the CAMC members is considered in the 
coming discussion. 
To who/ where can they sell ?
In relation to timber sale, the Management 
Operational Plan (2009) draws from the 
Conservation Area Management Rules of 1996, 
which state that the CAMCs are allowed to sell 
timber only to areas within the Mustang district 
of the ACAP. A CAMC respondent explained 
that the restrictions stemmed from the substantial 
dependency of those from barer parts of the 
district, positioning them as the district’s ‘timber 
basket’. Timber sale records (Fig. 1) show an 
increase in the amount of timber traded over 
the years, which reflects an increase in timber 
demand over the years with more demand from 
buyers outside this CAMC. The district’s growing 
furniture industry is the principal buyer. Some 
respondents suggested that if the market was not 
restricted, sales would likely expand to beyond 
the district, possibly at higher prices. 
How much can they sell for ? 
Current government regulation stipulates that 
timber may not be sold at less than NPR 100 
(USD 0. 96) per ft3 (i.e. about NPR, 3,531 or USD 
33.15, per m3), for outsiders. This CAMC sells 
timber at NPR 150 (USD 1.45) per ft3 (i. e. USD 
51. 20 per m3) to outsiders; insiders pay a highly 
subsidized price of NPR 10 (USD 0. 10) per ft3 (i. 
e. USD 3.53 per m3). Timber prices and income 
have increased over the years (Fig. 2), revealing 
an awareness and interest in maximizing income 
potential that was confirmed in interview. Timber 
prices in some neighbouring CAMCs are higher, 
at NPR 200 (USD 1.94) per ft3 (i.e. USD 68.51 
per m3). The CAMC respondents explained 
that while they are actively considering a price 
increase, current prices reflect careful rationales. 
Low insiders’ prices are believed to incentivize 
forest protection by the local users. The CAMC 
officials also justified their relatively lower prices 
for outsiders (compared to neighbouring CAMCs) 
by referring to their comparatively worse roads 
and severe topography that is more susceptible 
to flooding. Poorer access increases the price 
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for buyers, who bear the cost of harvesting and 
transport themselves. Therefore, selling timber at 
a price lower than neighbours enables them to be 
competitive. 
Fig. 2: Trend of timber income and price of the 
study site from 2008/9-2015/16
The years on the graph reflect the Nepali calendar. 
For instance, the year 2008/09 on the graph reflect 
the Nepali year of 2065, which begins in April/
May 2008 and ends on March/April 2009 when 
translated into the English calendar. This explains 
why the years on the graph overlap. Insiders are 
consumers of timber within the CAMC. Outsiders 
are consumers of timber outside the CAMC, but 
within the Mustang district of which the CAMC 
is a part. 
What are local development needs and 
ambitions ?
Respondents were questioned on their perceptions 
of local development needs, ambitions, and 
their priorities in relation to development and 
conservation. In terms of need, respondents 
referred to small industry development, 
better employment opportunities, and general 
education, mentioning the heavy reliance on 
“just agriculture” in problematic terms. Several 
expressed interest in more ecotourism in their 
area (also referred to above). It is also notable that 
one of the CAMC sub‒committees is explicitly 
dedicated to ‘tourism’. The same respondent 
described shifts in the community toward more 
“welcoming” attitudes to visitors as compared 
to the past. Another described the role for forest 
product sales, “The funds that we are generating 
helps the people in building some cottage 
industries and the harvesting also provides some 
employment for the youth in the area. So yes, 
it’s helping a lot in local development.” But as 
many respondents, this one quickly expressed 
concern for conservation goals : “The demand 
for timber is high. We fear we may not be able 
to meet the demand in a sustainable way. ” A 
few respondents described some dissatisfaction 
with the distribution of the CAMC funds to 
local development and livelihood enhancement 
vs. conservation. Two for instance referred to a 
lack of resource allocation to protect agricultural 
areas from wildlife disturbance. Yet overall, 
conservation was largely a part of any response 
to inquiries into local development - as if the two 
are for the most part inseparable. 
From the perspective of the ACAP, tourism has 
potential for this CAMC, but it is something 
for ‘the future’. The ACAP officials also 
acknowledged the importance of including 
development goals particularly for community 
motivation to conserve. The ACAP officer 
clarified their first priority : “As a conservationist, 
I must say we have to prioritize conservation”. 
Overall it appears The ACAP is both assisting 
tourism development and local development, but 
also holding it back when it appears to be in odds 
with conservation priorities. 
Discussion
In his work on the concept of ‘environmentality’, 
Agrawal (2005) describes a process by which 
people come to see themselves as defenders of 
the environment because of their involvement in 
regulatory practices. While we were unable to dig 
deeply into behaviour and value changes in practice 
across the community over time, many of the 
interview responses seem to align with the changes 
described by Agrawal (2005), corroborating with 
the idea that local decision-makers have become 
environmental subjects from their interaction 
with the regulatory system promoted through 
participatory forestry and championed by the 
ACAP officials. The CAMC members described 
a generally heavy reliance on the ACAP officials 
for practical issues (e. g. the presence of the ACAP 
officials is described as necessary to legitimate 
the CAMC decisions on which trees and how 
much they can harvest), which over time likely 
encroached even into the value system that the 
CAMC members promote in their community. 
Some described, “ACAP has had a very big impact 
on mindsets of people regarding conservation”. 
We learned that the ACAP officials take an active 
part in the CAMC meetings and during any key 
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decisions. The ACAP officials also acknowledged 
the influential role that they have on the committee 
members, which have led to substantial changes 
in community forest management practices. One 
ACAP conservation officer described the numerous 
awareness and conservation programmes they 
hold (also frequently referred to by the CAMC 
members), “to sensitize the local people of the 
importance of conservation”, noting, “We made 
them follow it strictly. ” 
This relationship between ACAP officers and 
CAMC officials appears to be a manifestation of 
mutually reinforcing disciplinary, truth, and sov-
ereign (state-authority driven) environmentalities 
(following Fletcher, 2010), through ACAP’s fre-
quent presence and heavy hand in forest manage-
ment as well as the emphasis on conservation as 
a primary value, where development goals are in-
strumentalized to motivate conservation behaviors 
(e.g. tourism only as it aligns with conservation). A 
conservation ethos certainly seems to be predomi-
nant in most de jure rules and de facto practices. 
In reaction to limitations on how much they can 
and do harvest, to what they can harvest (the ban 
on green timber), and where, the forest inventory 
data from Meilby et al., (2014) imply that increas-
ing harvest to maximum sustainable levels would 
allow for a tripling of forest income for the CAMC. 
The conclusions of Meilby et al. ’s work in 2014 
were reiterated during our own field work by a 
team of international foresters conducting technical 
research in the same area. After examining multiple 
forest plots (though less extensively than Meilby 
et al.) this group also called for the harvesting of 
green trees to improve forest condition and partic-
ularly, to allow for increased timber values to de-
velop - if desired Community sales records demon-
strate income from timber sales is increasing (Fig. 
2). Since timber prices have only risen marginally, 
this implies that the increase in income may be a 
result of increase in the number of customers or 
increases in the average transaction size. This cor-
responds to the CAMCs claim that the demand for 
timber in the region is very high. This reinforces the 
claim of Meilby et al. (2014) that incomes would 
rise if current harvest levels are increased, given 
the ongoing high demand for timber in the region. 
The demand for timber in Nepal is certainly high. 
The Himalayan Times (2016) reported that almost 
30 million cubic feet of timber were imported from 
e. g. Malaysia, Indonesia, and African countries, to 
fill the timber supply gap left as a result of strict 
regulations against extraction of timber in Nepali 
forests. Prices of timber also appear higher outside 
the Mustang district. For instance, the average price 
per cubic feet of the same timber produced in this 
CAMC, Pinus wallichiana, on the Nepali mar-
ket was reported at around NPR 900 (USD 8.73) 
(Housing Nepal, 2010), while the CAMC sold to 
outsiders (but within the district) at just NPR 70 
(USD 0.68). The high demand for timber and bet-
ter prices outside the Mustang district means that 
more income could be generated by expanding the 
market beyond the district. Therefore, a decision to 
leave timber in the forest suggests an inclination to-
wards conservation over local development. 
Yet while a conservation ethos manifests in 
some of the explanations of rules by the CAMC 
representatives, they are also concerned with 
more economic-oriented values of standing 
forests, suggesting the growth of a neoliberal 
environmentality that, for now, aligns with the 
overarching conservation agenda. For instance, 
litter from green trees provides an important source 
of mulch for their agricultural production - a main 
source of income for most - as opposed to purchasing 
expensive chemical fertilizer. Furthermore, the 
CAMC representatives’ interest in ecotourism 
also indicates that the environmental income from 
such activities in the area is more desirable than 
potential income from harvesting and sale of the 
green trees. One sub‒committee member (with an 
advantageous location for benefiting from tourism) 
stated "a lot of the revenue is being produced by 
the tourism, thousands of rupees" – despite that 
this has not yet really manifested in their area. 
Regarding timber sale price, the CAMC seems to 
be operating from a profit-maximizing rationale in 
that timber prices are set lower than neighbouring 
areas, to make up for their infrastructural and other 
accessibility challenges. We interpret their pricing 
decision as a thoughtful strategy to both conserve 
forests and support local development. Keeping 
price low for insiders is expected to induce resource 
conservation, which may be evident in how strictly 
the community seems to follow conservation 
rules, the low occurrence of illegal logging, and 
the abundance of timber resources that meet their 
needs. On the other hand, low prices of timber for 
insiders ensure that locals have access to cheap 
timber and fuelwood, which can induce savings 
on incomes. Such savings can be channeled into 
provision of other livelihood or local development 
needs, such as to support the education of children 
or purchase other household items. Of course, low 
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‘internal’ timber prices have been found to benefit 
the wealthier community members more, as they 
are often best enabled to channel cheap timber into 
infrastructure that allows them to benefit from, 
e.g., tourism opportunities (Lund et al., 2014). 
Poorer people, without the capital needed to take 
advantage, simply lose due to the lost revenue from 
sales that might have benefited everyone. Overall, 
the explanations and practices of the CAMC 
respondents (notably CAMC leadership) seem 
to echo Fletcher (2010) and others (Bluwstein, 
2017) depictions of a neoliberal environmentality 
that prioritizes conservation for positive economic 
incentives – with a particular bias in favour of 
already better off residents. We do wonder if this 
form of ‘environmentality’with its emphasis on 
profit, may come to undermine the other forms so 
carefully cultivated by conservation authorities. 
The practice of using small green trees for fencing 
poles by the CAMC elites (shunned officially and 
unlikely to be practiced by regular users), combined 
with the insistence of lower-ranking CAMC 
members (those from the ward level that are poorer 
and that do not hold executive positions within the 
CAMC) of the importance of protecting valuable 
green trees, also makes us also wonder if a sort of 
'trickle-down’ environmentality might be occurring. 
By this, we mean that whereas the CAMC elites, 
constituted by aspects of wealth/assets, education, 
caste, etc., are most likely to have participated in 
ACAP awareness and conservation programmes, 
we imagine a sort of ‘environmentality’ transfer 
taking place down to socially lower ranking 
community members. These members receive 
the knowledge of conservation practice and ethos 
from their authoritative/social ‘superiors’ through 
the regular practice of the CAMC meetings and 
responsibilities. Environmental ‘subjecthood’ is 
not necessarily a permanent condition, and the 
concern for the environment as pushed by the 
ACAP officials may now be pushed upon the 
lower ranking officials at sub‒committee level, 
to encourage their conformity to rules while 
freeing up elites to push the boundaries of legality 
so to speak for their own benefit (which at this 
limited scale is unlikely to cause substantial forest 
damage). In other words, if community elites 
can successfully (through indoctrination into a 
conservation morality), produce overall conformity 
to rules, then their occasional breaking of rules 
is unlikely to be seen as problematic by those to 
whom they are ultimately accountable to - the 
ACAP officials. This raises questions as to the 
effectiveness and durability of ‘environmentalities’ 
and in this case, particularly disciplinary and truth 
environmentalities that are based particularly on 
morality/belief systems. In fact, it is precisely 
the upward pathways of accountability that have 
complicated participatory resource management in 
practice in other parts of Nepal, whereby relations 
of patronage amongst community elites and forest 
officers come to outweigh the accountability of 
community group executives to regular and less 
powerful users (Malla, 2001). We suppose that if 
we were informed about the practice of green tree 
harvest for the use of elites within a relatively short 
field visit, other similar practices would likely 
come to light over time. As such, this context 
may contribute to increasing disparity within the 
community rather than comprehensive community 
development. The nature of environmentality 
transfer downward through social strata, as well 
as the effectiveness and durability of various 
environmentalities over time, are research arenas 
we hope more researchers will explore further, 
particularly through more in-depth research than 
we were able to conduct for this study. 
Conclusion
While at first glance some rules and practices 
appear to favour conservation due to their strictness 
in restricting the harvesting or commercialization 
of standing timber, a second look at the rationales 
behind those rules and some practices in the study 
area tell a more nuanced story. Overall it appears 
that the interests of the locals and the authorities 
converge, leading to resource conservation 
behaviours and outcomes, and there appear to 
be multiple environmentalities at work in the 
community - not purely the disciplinary and other 
environmentalities that imply the uptake of a 
morality of the intrinsic value of forests, but also 
a growing neoliberal environmentality oriented 
towards the economic potential of resource 
conservation. Further, we believe that there is 
a ‘trickle-down’ effect occurring in the study 
area, where disciplinary, sovereign, and truth 
environmentalities that promote both certain value 
systems (conservation for conservation’s sake), and 
the maintenance of systems of authority, first occurs 
through an indoctrination of community leaders 
via ACAP trainings (and frequent engagement 
in decision making spaces). Community leaders 
eventually transfer such environmental subject-
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hood to lower ranking community members, as 
they simultaneously take advantage of their own 
authority to push boundaries of legality. This we 
believe may have led to a broader community 
of “environmental subjects” - but we question 
whether it is effective and durable in terms of 
conservation goals. We also question durability of 
the conservation ethos under a growing (if slowly) 
neoliberal environmentality prioritizing profit. 
Future research could further investigate how 
exactly multiple environmentalities are taken up, 
maintained or contested, undermine one another 
and also travel among different types of people 
over time. Research on participatory forestry across 
Nepal has also indicated a persistent and widespread 
context of elite capture in decision-making and 
in the distribution of benefits. Thus, interrogating 
differences in the impacts of decisions across the 
communities also appears pertinent. 
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